《耶鲁大学开放课程:博弈论音频(含课堂板书和笔记)》(Game Theory (Open Yale Courses))[mp3][压缩包]

  • 状态:精华资源
  • 摘要:对白语言: 英语文字语言: 英文
  • 发布时间:2009/08/06 20:34:41
  • 更新时间:2009/08/09 17:06:17
  • 类别:资料,课程讲座
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资源介绍
中文名: 耶鲁大学开放课程:博弈论音频(含课堂板书和笔记)英文名: Game Theory (Open Yale Courses)别名: economic--game theory资源格式: 压缩包版本: [mp3]地区: 美国对白语言: 英语文字语言: 英文简介:
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越来越多的美国著名学府将课程的视频或者材料放在网上,这种开放性课程也受到了大家的欢迎。最近耶鲁大学在周二也推出了自己的开放性课程,全部是比较受欢迎的本科课程,主要包括教学大纲,题目汇总以及其他的课程相关材料,同时课程的音频和视频文件也包括在内。
毫无疑问,这一举动极大地方便了全球其他地方的学生能够接触到美国高等学府的课程,大家可以到Open Yale Courses的 站点查看。值得提到的一点是,所有的课程材料都采用了Creative Commons的Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0协议。因此所有的使用者都可以下载,分享这些材料,甚至对所有的课程材料进行演绎,只要不是用于商业用途,并且署名为Yale。
耶鲁大学开放课程博弈论是经济学科下的一门课程,课程内容均来自开放网站,另有网页和pdf格式的课堂板书和笔记,均为英文版,对于想提升相关专业英语水平或者要学习相近英文课程的同学来说,这是个不错的资源。资源包中的音频包括以下内容:
1 简介:五年前的教训
2 把自己变成其他人的鞋
3 迭代删除和位数选民定理
4 最佳反应在足球和商业伙伴关系
5 纳什均衡:坏时装及银行挤提
6 什均衡:约会和诺
7 纳什均衡:购物,并参加表决的常委会上线
8 纳什均衡:定位,隔离和随机
9 混合战略的理论和网球
10 混合战略棒球,约会和支付您的税
11 进化稳定:合作,突变,与平衡
12 进化稳定:社会公约,侵略,和周期期中考试
13 顺序游戏:道德风险,奖励和饥饿的狮子
14 落后的感应:承诺,间谍,和先行者优势
15 落后的感应:国际象棋,战略和可信的威胁
16 落后的感应:声誉和决斗
17 落后的感应:最后通牒和讨价还价
18 不完全信息:信息集和子博弈完美
19 子博弈完美均衡:招商引资和战略投资
20 子博弈完美均衡:战争的消耗
21 重复博弈:合作与结局
22 重复博弈:作弊,惩罚和外包
23 信息不对称:沉默,信令和苦难教育
24 信息不对称:拍卖和获奖者的诅咒
期末考试
About the Course
This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.
Course Structure:
This Yale College course, taught on campus twice per week for 75 minutes, was recorded for Open Yale Courses in Fall 2007.
About Professor Ben Polak
Ben Polak is a Professor of Economics and Management in the Department of Economics and the School of Management at Yale University. He received his B.A. from Trinity College, Cambridge University, his M.A. from Northwestern University, and his Ph.D. from Harvard University. A specialist in microeconomic theory and economic history, he has published in Economic Letters, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economic History, Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, and Econometrica. His current projects include Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem and Mean-Dispersion Preferences.
1. Introduction: five first lessons
2. Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
5. Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
6. Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
7. Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
9. Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
10. Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
11. Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
Midterm Exam
13. Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
14. Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
16. Backward induction: reputation and duels
17. Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
20. Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
21. Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
22. Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
23. Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
24. Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
Final Exam
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